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THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO FEMALE LEADERSHIP AT THE EXECUTIVE 
LEVEL AND IN TRADITIONALLY MASCULINE FIELDS: HOW WE CAN 
ERASE IMPLICIT DISCRIMINATION THROUGH THE LAW 
Grace S. Hong 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, studies have shown that organizations in which women are more 
strongly represented at board or top-management levels have seen more economic 
success.
1
 However, performance models and expectations remain male oriented, creating 
barriers to women’s entry into these influential positions.2  The schism between these 
expectations and women’s gender3 and sex create a number of problems generally foreign 
to their male counterparts, including the double burden syndrome (having to juggle both 
home and work life, though men are increasingly reporting that they too feel this burden), 
difficulty finding a mentor, and difficulty identifying with success or even taking 
responsibility for success.
4
 These problems are reflected statistically: women in high and 
mid-level management positions are more likely to feel discriminated against (27% of 
women compared to 7% of men), to be single (33% compared to 18% of men), and 
childless (54% of women compared to 29% of men).
5
  
Existing laws have proven unhelpful in changing the male-oriented models in the 
workplace, and in many cases have supported their continued existence.
6
 
Antidiscrimination laws have mainly focused on differences in biology, treating these as 
more legitimate than differences based on gender or the cultural manifestations of 
                                                     
1GEORGES DESVAUX, ET AL., WOMEN MATTER 1 (2007). 
2 Id. at 7. 
3See infra Part II.A (referring to the cultural manifestations of biological sex). 
4 See DESVAUX, supra note 1 at 7. 
5 Id. 
6 See infra Parts II, III, IV. 
 2 
characteristics of the male and female label.
7
  In this way, laws have failed to 
acknowledge that most sex discrimination cases are in fact responses to gender 
performance
8  
or an individual’s specific manner of self-presentation. 9  This 
“disaggregation of sex and gender” results in a legal system that perpetuates inequality in 
the workplace by holding people to different standards of appropriate gender 
performance based on whether they present themselves as male or female.
10
  
This problem becomes even more insidious—and harder to see—at the leadership 
level. Leadership, like many of the most elite occupations, has been historically 
characterized by masculinity, making such roles more difficult to attain for women who 
do not fit the masculine portrait.
11
 While women’s continued advancements in education 
will undoubtedly increase their presence in formal leadership roles and leadership roles 
that are easily influenced by popular culture, the law should intercede to the extent that it 
is informed by historical notions, and to the extent that it fails to address the issue of 
female leadership at the highest levels and in certain male-dominant fields, including, for 
example, the world of finance or the legal profession.  
This paper will proceed in the following manner. Part II will focus on defining 
gender generally and will present a brief legislative and political history of discrimination 
based on sex, showing how courts have been inconsistent in their interpretations of 
gender/sex in a way that has perpetuated sexual inequality. It will also specifically 
                                                     
7 See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination law: The Disaggregation of Sex 
From Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1996)(discussing the focus on biological sex by courts based 
on the belief that Congress had left no legislative history and biological recognition as the goal of Title 
VII). 
8 See infra Parts II, III, and IV. 
9 See generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 
(1990)(arguing that gender is a manifestation of concepts garnered from society rather than the 
expression of a prior reality).  
10 Franke, supra note 7, at 11. 
11 See infra Part IV.  
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highlight the way definitions of both sex and gender are used in transgender cases in 
order to emphasize the incredible impact inconsistent use of these terms has when applied 
to people who do not neatly fit into generalized expectations of what it means to be a man 
or a woman.  While transgender rights are not the focus of this paper, it is important to 
note that they are automatically implicated by a conversation about defining gender and 
sex in a uniform manner simply because of the categorically dualistic nature of sex and 
gender. Part III will show how the workplace often requires women to maintain very 
specific gender identities, and how these expectations negatively impact women, 
particularly in historically male-dominant fields. Part IV will examine how masculine 
expectations in leadership roles are keeping women out of these roles and present a 
unique danger to the development of equality in the workplace. Part V will conclude by 
focusing on women’s positive influence in organizational excellence and why these 
changes are crucial in today’s society. 
II. DEFINING GENDER AND REVEALING INCONSISTENCIES 
A. A Brief Political and Legislative History  
The term gender has not always meant what we think it means today. John 
William Money, a pioneer in the field of sexology, can be credited for permanently 
broadening our understanding of this term.
12
 Prior to his work in the 1950’s, gender was 
only associated with grammar
13
 and it wasn’t until 1972 that Money was able to 
popularize the notion that sex and gender were two distinct concepts.
14
 Today, the 
layperson is more than familiar with the term “gender.” In the day-to-day, many use the 
                                                     
12 J. Richard Udry, The Nature of Gender, 31 DEMOGRAPHY NO. 4 561, 561 (1994)(explaining the bio-
social origin of gender in females). 
13 See Id. (referring to a subclass of nouns in languages that contain a system of noun classification). 
14 ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY 3 
(2000)(describing the political, scientific, and sociological history of gender and sexuality). 
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term synonymously with biological sex, though the term as Money popularized it refers 
to the cultural manifestation of biological sex.
15
 Nonetheless, the expansion of the 
definition of gender has proven to be both a blessing and a curse in the context of 
contemporary sex discrimination jurisprudence. As Katherine M. Franke points out in her 
1995 article The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex 
from Gender, our sex discrimination jurisprudence grounds itself in the notion that sex 
and gender are two distinct aspects of human identity and further still, that “sex, 
conceived as biological difference, is prior to, less normative than, and more real, than 
gender.” 16  This has led to inconsistent and confusing results in cases of sex 
discrimination, and has rendered the law less than effective as a means of breaking the 
barriers to women’s rightful place in the workforce and in leadership roles.17 Thus, while 
the designation of “gender” as something separate from biological sex has helped to 
generally spread the understanding of a social aspect of sex, its later introduction has 
lessened its importance in the scheme of the law. 
A quick glance at our sex discrimination jurisprudence more than justifies 
Franke’s claim. The treatment of sex and gender in the case law is circumstantial and 
inconsistent.
18
 However, the confusion and disparate treatment of the terms have a clear 
source. While the legislative history of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 is extensive in its 
determinations concerning race and ethnicity, the term “sex” was included belatedly on 
                                                     
15 JOHN MONEY & ANKE A. EHRHARDT, MAN & WOMAN, BOY & GIRL: DIFFERENTIATION AND DIMORPHISM 
(1973)(arguing that gender and sexuality differentiation be based in individual biography and 
achievement rather than biological differentiation alone).  
16Franke, supra note 7, at 1. 
17 See infra Parts II, III, and IV. 
18 See Id. Courts vary between explaining discrimination as a product of differentiating based on 
biology and discrimination as a product of gross stereotyping. 
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the floor of the House of Representatives just before the legislation was passed.
19
 This 
has led many courts to conclude that they were on their own to define the word in line 
with the “plain meaning” rule of statutory construction.20 However, the belief that the 
courts had no guidance in defining the term “sex” meant they would ignore the political 
and legislative history outlining the fight for equal rights for women that began long 
before the Act was passed—a history that is crucial to understanding what “sex” really 
means. This history is critical because after their failure to get an equal rights amendment 
solely for the rights of women passed, early feminist ultimately used their lobbying 
powers to have “sex” included in Title VII instead.21 
The first equal rights amendment (ERA) was introduced in 1923 by the National 
Women’s Party (NWP), but was immediately met with opposition from the Women’s 
Bureau in the Department of Labor, as well as from several other women’s 
organizations.
22
 Opposition was based in the concern that the ERA as introduced would 
abolish protective labor laws that many women felt were still necessary.
23
 But the 
beginning of World War II and a shortage of domestic workers meant that women were 
occupying a greater portion of the wage-labor market than ever before.
24
 These changes 
brought to light a need for both “recognition and compensation” for the war-time work 
                                                     
19 See Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1167 (1971)(describing how the prohibition against sex discrimination was 
added without any prior hearings or debate in the House).   
20 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1986)(finding that Title VII was added at the 
last minute and that Courts have little legislative history for guidance); Ulane v.  Eastern Airlines, 742 
F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984)(finding that sex was added as the “gambit of a congressman seeking 
to scuttle adoption of the Civil Rights Act”); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 n.4 
(9th Cir. 1977)(stating that there is a “dearth of legislative history” regarding the addition of sex in 
Title VII). 
21 See generally, Jo Freeman, How “Sex” Got into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism As a Maker of Public 
Policy, 9 Law & Ineq. J. 163 (1991)(explaining how the inclusion of “sex” was ultimately the 
byproduct of the women’s movement for equal rights). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 165-70. 
24 Id. 
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that women were doing, and thus the National Women’s Party gained strength and 
support.
25
 An Equal Rights Amendment including women’s rights was lobbied for more 
aggressively by the NWP.  
From the 1940’s through the beginning of the 1960’s, Senator Pauli Murray 
suggested to both sides of the ERA struggle that the question of equality be taken to the 
courts.
26
 It was Murray’s understanding that receiving a Supreme Court ruling under the 
Equal Protection Clause could clarify the basic rights for women and do away with laws 
that arbitrarily impeded women’s presence in the public sphere. 27  This compromise 
ultimately led to the litigation of the most seminal Supreme Court cases relating to equal 
protection for women: Reed v. Reed,
28
 Frontiero v. Richardson,
29
 Schlesinger v. 
Ballard,
30
 and Craig v. Boren.
31
 These cases created a constitutional right to equality for 
women while also delineating the differences between the sexes and sex discrimination 
from the differences seen in race and racial discrimination.
32
 These cases therefore 
represent a significant part of the history of sex-based discrimination and in fact reveal to 
the careful historian that the protection accorded by the Supreme Court to women in the 
name of biological sex were in fact in response to discrimination based on gender roles.
33
  
                                                     
25 Freeman, supra note 21, at 170. 
26 Id. 
27 Franke, supra note 7, at 22. 
28 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
29 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
30 419 U.S. 498 (1975). 
31 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
32 Franke, supra note 7, at 23.  
33 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)(holding that Idaho statute preferring male estate 
administrators based on the history of their better qualification violated the equal protection clause 
of the Constitution); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)(holding that statute putting extra 
requirements on female members of armed forces to prove financial status before receiving certain 
benefits violated the Equal Protection Clause); Schlesinger v. Ballad, 419 U.S. 498 (1975)(holding that 
distinction between male and female officers standards of discharge for men and attrition for women 
were legitimately based on differences in service roles); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)(holding 
 7 
This is illustrated by the fact that the cases revolve around problems with sex-
based protective wage and hour rules, divorce, childrearing, and familial support 
obligations, all of which are representations of cultural norms adopted by men and 
women. While it could be argued that these norms arise from a biological difference, to 
the extent that they are social manifestations of biological differences, it is clear that the 
Supreme Court understood that sex-based discrimination was an impermissible 
acknowledgement of the social manifestations of biological difference. Thus, it would be 
disingenuous to suggest that the courts were without guidance in defining “sex” in the 
context of Title VII, when these cases were a meaningful step in the fight to include sex 
in Title VII at all.  After all, it was only through continuous lobbying efforts over the 
course of an extend time period before Title VII to pass an equal rights amendment that 
allowed “sex” to be included at the eleventh hour with success.34 
Therefore, a closer look at the fight for equality makes plain that the courts were 
not in fact, without guidance in the determining what Congress meant by “sex” in Title 
VII. The inclusion of sex was not haphazard and unplanned, but the result of a long battle 
for recognition largely powered by the NWP. However, the history does point out that 
certain implications of its inclusion had not been considered, namely questions regarding 
transgendered people and transsexualism. But to the extent that gender is a modern notion 
that only recently found its place in discourse and human understanding, it becomes clear 
that prior to the distinction between sex and gender, sex had been interpreted to include 
what gender connotes today, and therefore remains a loaded term that courts could mold 
                                                                                                                                                              
that statistical evidence based on driving differences between men and women do not support 
drinking age discrimination between males and females). 
34 LEILA J. RUPP & VERTA TAYLOR, SURVIVAL IN THE DOLDRUMS: THE AMERICAN WOMEN’S RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 
1945 TO THE 1960S 191 (1987)(recounting the history of the women’s movement). 
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to fit their needs. That some courts continue to refuse to acknowledge something beyond 
a biological definition of sex, reasoning that they have no guidance to believe otherwise, 
implies that the law probably would not be able to reach many individuals who have been 
discriminated against based on their sex or gender in the context of promotions and 
leadership positions.  
B. Sex Discrimination Based on Stereotyping  
In looking at the disparate treatment of the idea of gender and sex in case law, I 
will utilize a sample of cases in which various courts explain their own definitions in 
ways that are at odds with definition used by other courts. As will be garnered from this 
sampling, courts generally take one of two approaches: (1) they define gender/sex as 
either solely referring to biological or anatomical characteristics, leading to a finding of 
discrimination only in the context of biological distinction; or (2) they define sex/gender 
as an immutable characteristic and discrimination as a byproduct of improper 
stereotyping. These variations suggest that definitions of gender and sex are in fact 
circumstantial to the litigation at hand, with people at the fringes of their gender suffering 
the most.  
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
35
 the Supreme Court acknowledged that the 
definition of sex includes cultural and social notions, or gender in its primary definition. 
The Supreme Court is explicit: “In forbidding employers to discriminate against 
individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of 
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.” 36  In Price 
Waterhouse, a female senior manager was denied a promotion because she was 
                                                     
35 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
36  Id. at 248. 
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considered too masculine. Her superiors suggested that she take “a course at charm 
school” and that, were she more feminine, she would have a better chance of attaining the 
promotion.
37
 The Supreme Court held that “in the context of sex stereotyping, an 
employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she 
must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”38 Here, it is clear that the Court had 
moved beyond a simple biological distinction and acknowledges that the term “sex” as 
Congress intended, did in fact include the social and cultural manifestations of sex.  
Even prior to Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court had already implicitly 
affirmed the notion that “sex” incorporated both biological and cultural understandings of 
sex/gender in both Frontiero v. Richardson
39
 and Schlesinger v. Ballard.
40
 In Frontiero, 
the Court went into a lengthy consideration concerning the improper use of “common 
knowledge” ideas of women’s inferior status that Reed v. Reed41 resulted in the Idaho 
Legislature’s decision that “in general men are better qualified to act as administrator 
than are women.”42 The court states in Frontiero, “[a]s a result of notions such as these, 
our statute books gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the 
sexes, and, indeed, throughout much of the 19
th
 century the position of women in our 
society was, in many respects comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave 
codes….” 43  The court further explains that a “sex characteristic frequently bears no 
relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.”44 Similarly, in Schlesinger, the 
court explained again that “archaic and overbroad generalizations” could not be tolerated 
                                                     
37 Id. at 235. 
38 Id. at 250. 
39 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
40 419 U.S. 498 (1975).  
41 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
42 411 U.S. at 683. 
43 Id. at. 685. 
44 Id. at 686. 
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under the Constitution.
45
 There, a male naval officer claimed discrimination based on a 
statute that subjected only male naval officers to automatic discharge when they weren’t 
promoted consecutively was unconstitutional discrimination based on sex. 
This line of cases is significant because they affirm what other courts attempt to 
deny—that “sex” as included in Title VII does not merely refer to someone’s anatomical 
or biological characteristics, but also to the social implications of associating with the 
male or female label.
46
 When courts do acknowledge that “sex” in Title VII includes 
something more than biological traits, they are coming much closer to the reality of 
gender and sex as we experience them in every day settings. The term “female” does not 
necessarily have to connote femininity and being “male” does not necessarily implicate 
masculinity. Therefore, to the extent that leadership has been historically characterized by 
masculinity,
47
 courts must define sex and gender expansively in the context of Title VII 
discrimination cases in order to assure that they are not penalizing claimants for failing to 
conform with idealized notions of masculine and feminine behavior.   
C. Courts Define ‘Sex’ in Title VII as Referring to Biological or Anatomical 
Characteristics 
 
On the whole, it seems that courts prefer to define gender and sex in terms of 
biological and anatomical differences when the issue presented is one of discrimination 
based on transgender or gender identity confusion. When courts rely on biology, they 
generally find discrimination only when a person is treated differently because of their 
                                                     
45 419 U.S. at 508. 
46 See infra Parts II.C, III.B.  
47 See infra Part IV.B. 
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anatomical characteristics.
48
 As a preliminary issue, courts explain that they must take on 
the “plain meaning” approach and start off their inquiry by suggesting that Congress 
could not have meant to protect transsexuals under Title VII.
49
 And as can be seen from 
the political and legislative history accounted above, it is in fact true that the addition of 
“sex” did not necessarily consider the plight of transsexuals. Nonetheless, the way that 
the Supreme Court has ultimately construed “sex” in the context of equal rights and the 
14
th
 Amendment does suggest that courts must respond to cultural understanding of 
proper social roles.
50
 To that end, when courts take on this “plain meaning” approach of 
statutory construction, they should be considering whether the person that is being 
discriminated against is being treated differently for failing to conform to their expected 
gender roles like the Supreme Court did in Reed, Fronteiro, and other equal protection 
cases. However, as will be shown, Courts refrain from this broadened interpretation of 
sex and gender when considering marginalized groups, or people who do not fit into the 
neat little categorizations of what has historically been understood as “male” and 
“female”. The implication would be that even members of the population who do not 
suffer from gender dysphoria or recognize themselves as transgender may be denied 
protection under Title VII if they fail to conform to expectations of how they ought to 
behave as representatives of their sex.  
In Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
51
 a transsexual pilot brought suit, alleging 
discrimination after she was fired from her job as a pilot for the airline. The Seventh 
                                                     
48 See generally Ulane v. E. Airlines 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985); 
Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007); Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. 850 
F.Supp. 284 (1993). 
49 Id. 
50 See supra Part II.A.  
51 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985). 
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Circuit addressed the lack of a legislative history explaining the term “sex” and the lack 
of any intent to protect transsexuals as a class of people under Title VII.
52
 The court then 
explaind that why the discrimination that Ulane experienced did not amount to sex 
discrimination:  
If Eastern had considered Ulane to be female and had discriminated 
against her because she was female (i.e. Eastern treated females less 
favorably than males), then the argument might be made that Title VII 
applied, but this is not the case. It is clear from the evidence that if Eastern 
did discriminate against Ulane, it was not because she is female, but 
because Ulane is a transsexual—a biological male who takes female 
hormones, cross-dresses, and has surgically altered parts of her body to 
make it appear female.
53
 
 
The court here very clearly draws a distinction between sex discrimination as dependent 
on the original biological status of the person and demands that femininity belong to 
biological females and masculinity to biological males. 
 Similarly, in Dobre v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak),
54
 a transsexual 
employee alleged discrimination based on her transsexualism. Here, the court 
immediately attempts to distinguish sex from gender and states that the term “sex” as 
used in Title VII is not synonymous with the term “gender,” and that Congress’s use of 
“sex” was simply in reference to “an individual’s distinguishing biological or anatomical 
characteristics,” whereas gender would have encompassed discrimination based on sexual 
identity.
55
 The court then clarifies that a transsexual person would have a claim for sex 
discrimination if the person were discriminated against because of his or her sex, that is, 
if Amtrak had actually considered Dobre to be female and discriminated against her “on 
                                                     
52 Id. at 1084. 
53 Id. at 1087. 
54 850 F.Supp. 284 (1993).  
55 Id. at 286. 
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that basis.”56 But from there the analysis takes a different turn, and the court backtracks 
from their “biology only” distinction to state that discrimination based on stereotypic 
conceptions about a woman’s ability to perform a job or discrimination based on 
conditions common to women alone could constitute discrimination.
57
 The court then 
determines that Dobre was discriminated against because she was perceived as a male 
who wanted to become female,
58
 without realizing that based on their logic, Dobre had a 
legitimate claim for discrimination as a man: Dobre was penalized for not falling in line 
with stereotypic conceptions about men’s abilities and conditions common to man.  
 More recently, in Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, a male diagnosed with gender 
identity disorder (GID) was fired because of concerns as to which bathroom he would be 
using while on the job (employees used public restrooms.)
59
 The Tenth Circuit, again 
recounting the lack of legislative history and any congressional intent to protect 
transsexuals under Title VII, concluded like many other courts, that “sex” was in 
reference to the binary conception of sex and could not include transsexuals.
60
 
 Prior to the Tenth Circuit’s affirmation of the Utah District Court’s decision, the 
Utah Court went to great lengths to distinguish itself from the Sixth Circuit,
61
 where two 
cases involving transsexuals were treated as having legitimate claims under Title VII by 
extension of the rationale used in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.
62
 The court explains that 
there is a “huge difference” between an unfeminine woman and a man who is attempting 
to become a woman, and announces that such drastic changes should not be characterized 
                                                     
56 Id. at 287. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007). 
60 Id. at 1221.  
61 No. 2:04CV616 DS, 2005 WL 1505610 (D. Utah Civ. R. 7-2 June 24, 2005).  
62 Id. at 4. 
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as “failure to conform to stereotypes.” 63  It further cited the DSM-IV, the American 
Psychiatric Association’s Manual for Mental Disorders, to support its conclusion that 
GID goes beyond nonconformity to touch upon stereotypes.
64
 The court then noted that 
even after Price Waterhouse, the narrower Ulane approach to “sex” in Title VII continues 
to be followed. The court went on to explain that allowing this “failure to conform to 
stereotypes” as legitimate reasoning in the finding of discrimination is essentially a 
“slippery slope”:  
In fact, if something as drastic as a man's attempt to dress and appear as a 
woman is simply a failure to conform to the male stereotype, and nothing 
more, then there is no social custom or practice associated with a 
particular sex that is not a stereotype. And if that is the case, then any male 
employee could dress as a woman, appear and act as a woman, and use the 
women's restrooms, showers and locker rooms, and any attempt by the 
employer to prohibit such behavior would constitute sex stereotyping in 
violation of Title VII.
65
 
  
 This type of thinking about gender and sex highlights courts’ reluctance to 
broaden sex-related discrimination statutes beyond biology. The findings in cases like 
Dobre and Ulane take on a view that Professor Katherine Franke stated most eloquently, 
in which “one’s inside—is immutable—whereas gender identity—one’s outside—is 
mutable. Yet for the transgendered person, the sexed body—one’s outside—is regarded 
as mutable while one’s gender identity—one’s inside—is experienced as immutable.”66  
And so it seems that there are genuinely two distinct ways to understand sex 
discrimination as defined by our courts. One approach equates simple differentiation 
between the sexes as discrimination, while the other equates the generalization of 
                                                     
63 Id. at 5. 
64 Id. 
65 Id.  
66 Franke, supra note 7, at 35. 
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differences as discrimination.
67
 But no matter which approach a court takes in its 
explanation of sex discrimination, the law assumes a natural and biological foundation to 
sexual difference, ignoring the reality that gender norms, not biological facts, are at the 
core of the differences we recognize in the two sexes. As Franke points out in her article, 
when women are denied employment, very rarely is it because the discriminator 
genuinely believes that the Y chromosome is necessary for the job.
68
 To that end then, 
Franke is correct in stating that biology and genitals are simply “false proxies for the real 
rules of both gender attribution and sexual identity in our culture.”69 In the context of 
leadership, I argue that it is these types of people – people who do not generally meet 
societal expectations of their gender/sex, that are most likely to be overlooked for 
promotions and leadership positions. Moreover, to the extent that they attempt to look to 
the courts for a remedy, they will be unlikely to succeed so long as courts continue to use 
varying definitions of sex and gender. 
III. THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY WORK FOR WOMEN 
When considering leadership and the workplace, the normative views on gender 
and biological sex become extremely problematic, as leadership itself has historically 
been characterized by masculinity.
70
 The dualistic thinking about gender/sex is a 
legitimate concern because it makes it harder to see the interrelated-ness of male and 
female, masculinity and femininity. So as long the legal system continues to equate 
femininity with females and masculinity with males, sex discrimination at the leadership 
level will be difficult to prove, since men, by virtue of being male, would seemingly be a 
                                                     
67 See generally supra Part II.B. 
68See Franke, supra note 7, at 12 n.143(explaining cases and studies by which actual biology is a 
factor, namely pregnancy).  
69 Id. at 38. 
70 See infra Part V. 
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better fit for those roles. Furthermore, the courts are unable to take into account the 
amount of mental maintenance work women are ultimately required to do in the 
workplace in order to overcome masculine workplace expectations. This suggests that 
courts do not take into account the negative impact this type of maintenance and identity 
work
71
 has on women. As a result, these women are less likely to receive promotions and 
offers to important leadership positions—positions which are essential to influencing 
large groups of people and changing the way we view women’s proper role in society.  
A. Understanding the Effects of Identity Work on Women 
 Identity work is the concept that people have to negotiate between their sense of 
self and external pressure to behave a certain way.
72
 It is called “work” because it 
requires and consumes resources from the person in the form of time and effort.
73
 For 
example, in order to conform to a particular work environment, a woman might invest in 
an entirely new wardrobe. This would cost both time and money, and therefore is a type 
of “work.” While it is true that everyone must perform identity work in order to navigate 
their social setting, “outsider groups,” like women and minorities, perceive themselves as 
being subject to stereotypes that must be overcome.
74
 This expands the amount of work 
that they must do.  To that end, a woman generally has to commit to a greater amount of 
work in order to maintain her identity in male-dominant fields and signal to the dominant 
group that she in fact is a member the group. 
                                                     
71 See infra Part III.A (defining identity work as the idea that we must negotiate between a sense of 
self and external pressures to behave a certain way. Called work because it consumes resources in 
the form of energy and time). 
72 See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, n.2 
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Dr. Cordelia Fine explains this phenomenon as “stereotype threat” or “the real-
time threat of being judged and treated poorly in settings where a negative stereotype 
about one’s group applies.”75  The significance of stereotype threat is best illustrated 
through sociological studies, whereby simply lowering the threat changes the 
performance ability of individuals.
76
 For example, when a calculus test was presented to a 
group of men and women in the standard manner by which most tests are administered, 
women did not perform as well as their male counterparts. However, when that same test 
was administered and the exam takers were told beforehand that the exam had proven to 
be equally hard for men and women, women actually performed better on the same test.
77
 
These types of studies show that by simply changing the perceived level of threat, we can 
enhance or reduce the ability of a given group of people.  Dr. Fine further explains that 
triggering the realization that a negative stereotype about one’s group is in effect can 
occur in “disquietingly natural” ways: 
Stereotype threat effects have been seen in women who: record their sex at 
the beginning of a quantitative test; are in a minority as they take the test; 
have just watched women acting in air-headed ways in commercials, or 
have instructors or peers who hold—consciously or otherwise—sexist 
attitudes. Worse still, subtle triggers for stereotype threat seem to be more 
harmful than blatant cues, which suggests the intriguing possibility that 
stereotype threat may be more of an issue for women now than it was 
decades ago, when people were more loose-lipped when it came to 
denigrating female ability.
78
 
 
 In the same vein, Dr. Fine points out recent studies revealing that recognition of a 
stereotype’s applicability to one’s social group in the course of one’s work makes that 
individual perform worse because it takes extra mental resources to suppress those 
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negative ideas and anxieties about themselves.
79
 This is an important consideration in the 
promotion context because it is likely that the more a woman feels that she might be 
stereotyped as a bad leader or unfit for the job by virtue of her womanhood, the more 
likely it is that she will actually be a bad leader. This can be a rather serious problem 
because in order to perform well in leadership capacities, she needs to remain focused 
and confident, yet while working under the threat of stereotype, it is more likely that she 
will be distracted by “self-doubts and anxieties” that impede her abilities.80 
Another significant consequence of stereotype threat is that it creates a “failure-
prevention mindset”:  
“The mind turns from a focus on seeking success (being bold and creative) 
to a focus on avoiding failure, which involves being cautious, careful, and 
conservative (referred to as promotion focus and prevention focus, 
respectively). With horrible irony, the harder women try to succeed in 
quantitative domains, the greater the mental obstacles become for several 
reasons.... Also, the more difficult and nonroutine the work, the more 
vulnerable its performance will be to the sapping of working memory, and 
possibly the switch to a more cautious problem-solving strategy.”81 
 
Again, stereotype threat and the extra burden in negotiating it is by no means a “women’s 
problem.” Stereotype threat will work against any person who stands at odds with 
whatever the norms are in his/her specific social environment. But because leadership 
positions are those that yield a high degree of influence and power, overcoming the 
damaging effects of stereotype threat to women and minorities who are attempting to 
gain these positions (positions which have been historically denied to them) cannot be a 
simple feat. Complicated studies that have looked into the effects of ambition and drive 
in relation to higher testosterone levels suggest that the negative stereotype of women’s 
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lesser ability when compared to men’s is even more harmful to the type of woman who is 
already struggling to rise in the ranks of her field.
82
 A woman exposed to negative 
stereotypes about her group’s ability can suffer from a “cognition-impairing mismatch” 
between her desire for high status and the low status that the stereotype ascribes to her.
83
 
In these areas, the implicit stereotyping of gender and the existing gender gap mutually 
reinforce and feed into one another.
84 
 In sum, the identity work and negotiating that women must do in attempts to gain 
leadership positions or even just to fit into the culture of their workplace present a 
genuine obstacle mostly overlooked by anti-discrimination laws in their current form. 
Devon W. Carbado and Mitu Gulati, professors of law at UCLA and Duke University 
respectively, suggest that there are three distinct barriers that women face as a direct 
result of the identity work they have to do, barriers that current anti-discrimination law 
does not consider in their findings of discrimination.
85
  First, because anti-discrimination 
laws aim to compensate the victims of discrimination for the costs and burdens the 
discrimination caused in their lives, the failure of these laws to take into account the way 
masculine norms burden non-masculine women (and non-masculine men!) in the 
workplace means that they do not take into consideration the extra costs of trying to 
“blend in” to the culture of her work environment.86 In other words, the more a woman 
tries to negotiate her identity to make “insiders,” or the dominant group, comfortable, the 
more difficult it would be for her to prove that she had been subject to discrimination. 
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Carbado and Gulati call this the “capture problem” since there is a failure in the law to 
capture or grasp the full costs of discrimination for these women.
87
 Similarly, Carbado 
and Gulati point out an “evidentiary problem”: so long as a woman successfully engages 
in negotiating her identity to fit the workplace, she is undermining her ability to bring a 
claim for discrimination thereafter.
88
 Finally, antidiscrimination law adopts the 
presumption that if the employer can show that it has hired or promoted several outsiders 
who belong to the same social minority as the particular employee, it can serve as proof 
that the failure to promote in the individual case was not motivated by discriminatory 
reasons.
89
 Carbado and Gulati call this the “doctrinal problem,” explaining that it ignores 
the reality that employers are responding to not only the identity status of the woman, but 
also to her conduct, and whether she is a positive or negative reflection of other women.
90
 
To that end, acceptance into a certain community requires more than just fitting into 
general stereotypes, but fitting into the specific stereotypes shared by the members of that 
community about what it means to be a man and woman.  
Thus, a court’s definition of “sex” may not be the only factor in determining 
whether or not a female claimant can succeed in a discrimination case in the context of 
promotions and access to leadership positions. So long as laws fail to consider the full 
spectrum of behavior that is required of a woman in order to prove herself worthy of 
traditionally masculine positions, courts are unlikely to find that she had been the victim 
of discrimination, or even that she objectively qualified for a leadership position, based 
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on the belief that a “female identity” is at odds with the masculine characteristics of 
leadership.  
B. Identity Work in Discrimination Cases 
 This is not to say that the courts have never considered identity work in 
discrimination cases. Courts have in fact considered various aspects of gender 
performance, but whenever it is considered, it is sharply limited or curtailed. These cases 
considering performance are called the “sex plus” cases in that they find discrimination 
when based on a policy that is directed at sex “plus” some other characteristic.91 For 
instance, in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
92
 a woman was denied employment by 
virtue of her status as a woman and mother to a young child. The Supreme Court 
recognized that just because the employer had employed other women did not mean they 
were allowed to discriminate against a sub-category of women, in this case, women with 
young children.
93
 The court ruled that Phillips could not be treated differently based on 
this one aspect of her identity.
94
 Clearly, Phillips’ employer believed, and not without 
reason, that her identity as a young mother would impede her ability to meet the 
expectations of her job, as though the mere fact that she had a young child guaranteed 
that she would be unfit to meet the needs of her occupation. The Supreme Court tells us, 
in so many words, that this type of assumption is not appropriate in the context of 
employment. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit recognized in Allen v. Lovejoy
95
 that suspending 
a female employee for refusing to adopt her husband’s last name in the work place was 
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sex discrimination.
96
 Again, the court seems to be aware that the employer was 
penalizing the plaintiff for defying their expectation as to proper behavior for female 
employees. This, they determined, constituted discrimination.
97
 
 Nevertheless, the court’s willingness to recognize the inappropriateness of 
discrimination based on gender/identity performance in this arena ends there, as courts 
have been opposed to extending the doctrine to cover performances of identity in the 
every-day context. Courts have consistently rejected challenges to employers’ dress-and-
appearance requirements, insisting that such requirements are “trivial” matters reflecting 
“personal preference” that are completely under the employee’s control.98 Some courts 
have even gone as far as to limit the sex-plus doctrine explicitly to cases that involve 
biological characteristics, the exercise of a constitutional right, or serious deprivation of 
opportunities.
99
  
 Courts have also overlooked the difficulty of identity work by requiring that 
gender performance be in accordance with the will of majority or dominant group, or 
whoever is responsible for dictating the social environment.
 100
  By doing so, the courts in 
essence affirm the notion of a “right” way to be woman and a “right” way to be man. 
This idea is best illustrated in sex discrimination cases wherein plaintiffs are denied their 
claims.
101
 The courts in their decisions are solidifying the notion that both they and 
employers have the authority to decide which generalized notions of male and female are 
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acceptable or unacceptable.  In a group of cases aptly named the “haircut” cases, many 
courts determined that sex discrimination could not be found based on employer 
standards regarding hair length for men.
102
 The courts take the stance that hair length is a 
matter of choice, not an immutable characteristic, and therefore employers have a right to 
exercise their discretion in this area.
103
 The Fifth Circuit in Willingham v. Macon 
explains: “Distinctions in employment practices between men and women on the basis of 
something other than immutable or protected characteristics do not inhibit employment 
opportunity in violation of Title VII.”104 
 In line with the belief that the courts and employers can determine proper gender 
performance, in Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, the court found there was no violation 
of Title VII when a female secretary was fired for wearing pantsuits.
105
 The court 
determined that wearing pantsuits was something that the plaintiff did because she 
wanted to and that the policy did not perpetuate a stereotype about her gender but merely 
reflected the plaintiff’s personal beliefs.106 The Supreme Court has also affirmed this 
belief in addressing gender performance in Meritor Savings Bank.
107
 While the Court 
there did ultimately hold in favor of the discriminated employee, the court also made 
clear that a plaintiff’s performance could be relevant in a sexual harassment claim to 
address the question of whether the harassing conduct was “welcomed” by the plaintiff: 
“While voluntariness in the sense of consent is not a defense to a sexual harassment 
claim, it does not follow that a complainant’s sexually provocative speech or dress is 
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irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether he or she found particularly sexual 
advances welcome.”108  
Based on the rationales noted in the above cases, it seems that courts are 
unwilling to acknowledge that conforming to workplace expectations may require a 
significant amount of identity work. Men and women may be required to engage in 
behavior that is not in line with either their own identities, or on the other hand, engage in 
behavior that is not in line with general social expectations of how females and males 
ought not to behave as representatives of their social group. While the court found that 
the plaintiff in Lanigan could be penalized for wearing pants in blatant disregard of the 
employer’s preference for more stereotypically feminine women,109 in Meritor the court 
acknowledges that a woman with a tendency to be sexually provocative in speech or 
dress may be denied her claim to sexual harassment, in that it may be probative of 
whether she welcomed sexual advances, although both types of actions could easily be 
seen as a type of identity work a woman had to do in order to preserve her job or preserve 
her sense of dignity. Nevertheless, the courts are willing to place the burden of 
conformity entirely on the claimants of discrimination both for the failure to conform and 
for conforming “too well.” If either type of woman (a woman who conforms and a 
woman who does not) were to make a claim for discrimination in the workplace, both 
could easily fail to meet the legal standard of discrimination, whether by virtue of a 
finding that discrimination can only be based on biological sex, or by virtue of a failure to 
prove that she was in fact discriminated against because she blended herself by partaking 
in the workplace culture.  
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 In the same vein, courts have also found that women who are masculine are 
inviting harassment or that women who try to accommodate their work environment by 
engaging with their harassers have in fact welcomed it.
110
 One particularly grotesque 
example of this understanding is encapsulated in Reed v. Shephard, where the court 
determined that that the plaintiff had lost her claim by using offensive language, engaging 
in “exhibitionistic” behavior, giving “suggestive gifts” and otherwise engaging in 
sexualized conduct with her harassers.
111
 What the court failed to take into consideration 
was the instigating actions of the plaintiff’s harassers and how Reed was attempting to 
negotiate her identity in order for her harassers to accept her into an existing work 
community that was already sexually charged.
112
 Reed stated explicitly that she did not 
complain about the harassment because she wanted to be accepted by her peers: “It was 
important to me to be a police officer and if that was the only way that I could be 
accepted, I would just put up with it and kept [sic] my mouth shut.”113  
 Similarly in Weinsheimer v. Rockwell, the plaintiff was a female employee 
working in the largely male-dominant field of engineering.
114
 The Court denied 
Weinsheimer’s claim of sexual harassment, explaining that much of her problem with the 
behavior of her harassers had to do with the fact she, for whatever reason, “perceived” 
herself as not being held to the same standard as her male counterparts, implying it was a 
problem within herself.
115
 Further, the court stated that while in fact the harassing 
behavior that Weinsheimer was complaining about did occur, Weinsheimer was one of 
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the chief participants in the creation of the sexually charged atmosphere with her 
“confrontational and abusive” personality as evidenced by the way Weinsheimer 
interacted with her boyfriend and by the way she responded to sexual speech with equally 
sexual speech.
116
  
 It is difficult to reconcile such cases that so obviously enforce a standard of 
“commonly accepted social norms” and reification of “female = femininity, male = 
masculinity” with a legislative mandate that courts also say was intended “to strike at the 
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women” resulting from stereotypes.117 
The fact that the approach a court may take has differed over time and place further 
shows the difficulty courts have had in separating a person from socially contrived 
understandings of “appropriate” behavior based on their gender, and the actual 
relationship the division of appropriateness has to biological sex and discrimination. 
Thus, when considering identity work in the context of sex-based discrimination, one can 
wonder whether women have actually been further disadvantaged by a legal system that 
is supposed to help them overcome the difficulties of a male-dominant workplace.  
While ignorance to identity work and stereotype threat is clearly a general danger 
present at every level of social interaction, perhaps having seen the insidious nature of 
discrimination makes it easier to understand why even after all these years, women have 
yet to climb the ranks of leadership with the ease of their male counterparts. Male 
dominance in the workforce and in particular areas of work is a historical relic and to the 
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extent that that law holds onto those notions of gender propriety, women will continue to 
struggle to find their place at the top.  
IV. LEADERSHIP: CHANGING DEFINITIONS TO RESPOND TO CRISIS 
A. Understanding Leadership as a Social Construct 
For too long, the concepts of leadership and successful leadership have been 
dominated by polarized thinking. As patriarchies became the mainstay for complex 
economies, the notion that there was a proper place for an individual based on her gender, 
ethnicity, and social class slowly settled into the basic framework of everyday life.
118
 To 
be sure, these are historical relics, notions that have been passed on generation to 
generation through societal and group norms. But as barriers to education and 
opportunity were broken and equality became the standard promise, what was once a 
“concrete wall” gave way to the concept of merit-based advancement.119 
Today, most Americans want to believe that people are hired, fired, and promoted 
in the workplace based on individual abilities and accomplishments.
120
 They believe that 
people should not be disqualified from positions at any level merely because of 
superficial characteristics or personal beliefs. Reflecting these convictions, barriers that 
minority groups encounter no longer take the obvious form of exclusion at a particular 
level. Instead, they have become embedded in our notions of identity, belongingness, and 
success.
121
 These implicit associations
122
 limit society’s ability to move forward by acting 
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as mental block to what one can or cannot do. They define what pathways are 
inappropriate or appropriate based on characteristics that are not as static as people are 
led to believe.
123
 By being more conscientious of an individual’s capacity to achieve 
outside of socially constructed notions of ability, individuals can help produce a more 
productive and effective society—people could reach their true potential. 
It goes without saying that ethnicity does not affect the inherent ability of a 
person. The idea that someone might even limit another based on his or her race or 
nationality is abhorrent to most of us. Moreover, life-experiences help solidify the notion 
that one is not incapable or lesser because of race. And yet this perception does not seem 
to reach the realm of gender. The idea that biological sex and therefore gender plays an 
enormous role in innate abilities and skills is not only embraced, but also justified with 
science. Men and women are different because they have different brains, they say. And 
it’s true; MRI scans of a male brain and female brain will show stark differences.124 But 
if difference is hardwired from birth, how in the world could a man and a woman share 
the same ideas and abilities? Can persisting inequalities in gender really be blamed on the 
brain?  
The main problem with science-based theories on gender differences is that they 
justify separation of roles for men and women. They suggest that people have an 
appropriate place within society based on their inherited biological nature. This 
perception reigns even for leadership roles: only 13% of all employed women occupy 
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management positions, compared with 16% of employed men.
125
 What is more, the 
perception that women are more socially oriented and empathetic has relegated them as 
mainstays in support areas of corporate businesses rather than in line for executive 
positions.
126
 What must be fundamentally understood is that any overarching patterns of 
differences based on social group we see today are in fact socially constructed and 
perpetuated. After all, gender, just like ethnicity, is simply a grouping of select 
characteristics that we associate with biological characteristics. Beyond that, it is difficult 
to suggest that characteristics of gender are inherent. Therefore, the continued exclusion 
of women in significant leadership roles today ought to be carefully scrutinized in an 
effort to insure that such exclusion is objectively legitimate and not simply a result of 
implicit associations or a reliance on older notions of what men and women are capable 
of doing better (or worse) than their counterparts. 
B. Origins of Gender and Gender Characteristics in Relation to Leadership 
Qualities 
In order to clarify the socially constructed nature of leadership as well as the 
socially constructed nature of supposedly “masculine” characteristics, looking at 
biological foundations may be helpful. By impressing upon the law the truth that biology 
does not necessarily define the characteristics that a man or woman will show in his/her 
behavior, the law will be forced to look more objectively at the qualifications that make a 
person more or less suitable for a particular leadership position instead of focusing on 
whether the claimant is barred from making a claim based on the way that they perform 
their gender. This truth can be garnered by looking at studies of prenatal and infant 
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development. Babies are not born with an understanding of gender or race; they are blank 
slates ready to learn from their own experiences. At birth, there are only a handful of 
characteristics that distinguishes a female baby and a male baby.
127
 Notably, at birth, 
boys are larger than girls, and their brains are 9% larger.
128
 Meanwhile, female infants 
develop faster beginning from midgestation and ending with their earlier entry into 
puberty.
129
 And that about sums up the essential differences between male and female 
babies at birth. Any inherent differences that we see in personality are small differences 
that are largely shaped by learning.
130
 So while girls and boys enter the world with slight 
variations in social and emotional styles, it is the reaction of the person who encounters 
these differences that ultimately trains the way these children respond—social tendencies 
become selectively reinforced by the parents who raise their children.
131
 In other words, 
parents tend to treat male and female babies differently, not because they actually are so 
different, but because of their own preconceived notions of what it means to be male or 
female.
132
 Furthermore, the rest of society will continue to engage with babies and 
children in response to their sex thereby perpetuating the societal norms and behaviors 
deemed appropriate to them, and thereby solidifying the child’s conceptions of gender 
and appropriateness.
133
  
So if femininity and masculinity are largely taught, and is not inherently 
embedded into every person, then the psychological differences we experience every day 
should be explained as the result of years of masculine or feminine ideology inflicted 
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upon the brain until the differences becomes more or less permanently ingrained.
134
 The 
Bio-Social Origins theory of psychological sex differences as adopted by social 
psychologists Wendy Wood and Alice Eagly suggests that psychological sex differences 
stem mainly from the types of roles filled by men and women within societies.
135
 The 
ability to perform various roles depended on inherited physical attributes—women raised 
children because they were physically able to carry them to term and nurse them. This 
gave men the initial freedom to fill the other social roles as the need arose.
136
 Moreover, 
men’s greater size and strength gave them an advantage in fulfilling many of the roles 
associated with production tasks before industrialization. These roles then gave them 
control over resources and helped them to amass social power. 
137
Over time, as division 
of labor became less rigid, men and women have been able to equally show their ability 
to contribute in different areas of society, and the boundary between gender roles began 
to fade. Nevertheless, the notion of appropriateness of social roles persisted in some areas 
as though division of labor was still required. Thus, as “men and women continue to 
divide important life tasks by sex, no one should be surprised by the continuing existence 
of psychological sex differences.”138 
Descriptions of “good” leaders show that the concept of leadership has been 
infused with concepts of masculinity and manliness.
139
 For example, in identifying six 
activities required of managers in business organizations, management scholar John 
Miner, explains that managers must behave assertively, stand out from the group, be able 
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to tell others what to do, and be willing to compete with their peers.
140
 On the other hand, 
descriptions of managers have started to include some stereotypically feminine qualities 
such as being helpful and understanding.
141
 Nevertheless, even with the gradual 
acknowledgement of the positive qualities typically associated with femininity into our 
understanding of leadership, there is still a demonstrated masculine nature to managing 
roles.
142
  This is not to suggest that models of leadership are completely rigid, but instead 
that they vary with the context in which the leaders must act. In organizations built 
around hierarchies, rank will influence how the members understand leaders.
143
 For 
example, the higher the level of rank or office, the more masculine qualities will 
dominate, whereas in middle level positions, traditionally feminine traits such as human 
relationship skills and other skills that foster cooperation and helping development of 
subordinates are considered better.
144
 A good way to consider the difference is by 
comparing the role of an elementary school principle with that of a corporate CEO or 
military officer.
145
 Nonetheless, ultimately, the most powerful and influential roles are 
identified most closely with agentic and masculine notions.  
Consequently, men gain a ”double advantage” in leadership contests with women. 
Eagley explains the advantage thusly:  
First, he is of course immediately categorized as male, which activates 
masculine associations, which are similar to beliefs about leaders and thus 
increase the odds that he is regarded as a leader. Once a man is viewed as a 
leader, the qualities associated with leadership are further ascribed to him, 
giving him an additional edge in the competition for leadership roles—no 
such bolstering occurs for women. Even when women behave agentically, 
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people may not recognize her behavior as competitive or assertive. Gender 
stereotypes aid men on their path to leadership but complicate the labyrinth 
that women negotiate on their way to positions of authority.
146 
 
In complete contrast, female leaders are disadvantaged from their status as both 
woman and leader, and instead are subject to covert forms of prejudice and 
discrimination. Unlike the double advantage that men have, women are confronted with 
the “double bind.” Eagley defines the double bind as the conflict between the expectation 
of communal behavior from a woman and the expectation of agentic behavior as a 
leader.
147
 No matter what she does, a woman in a leadership capacity will more likely be 
subject to criticism for either not being a good leader or not being a good woman. For 
example, in studies conducted by psychologists Ziva Kunda, and Steven Spencer, they 
found that helpfulness was met with approval when coming from men, but not when 
coming from women.
148
 In the same vein, when men were unhelpful, they often got away 
with it, whereas unhelpfulness in women was met with criticism or some other penalty.
149
 
In a different organizational study conducted by Ziva Kunda and Paul Thagard, the 
psychologists found that when employees reported helping their organizations beyond 
levels required of them by their position, male employees received more promotions 
while the promotions female employees received had no relation to their self-reported 
helpfulness.
150
 Studies have also consistently found that women who exert nonverbal 
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dominance (such as staring directly at the other while speaking, or pointing at others) are 
perceived more unfavorably than men who engage in such behavior.
151
 Similarly, verbal 
intimidation has often worked to undermine women’s chances of advancing in her career 
or even being hired.
152
  
Unsurprisingly, the mere act of disagreeing can also serve to undermine a 
woman’s appeal and influence while men who disagree often do not suffer from such 
consequences.
153
  Multiple studies taken across nations have shown that communication 
styles of men, whether warm or dominant, have little consequence on their likability or 
influence.
154
 However, women are deemed more likable only when they are warm and 
friendly, leaving assertive or more aggressive women to be penalized for their failure to 
be likable or feminine, at least as evidenced by warmth and friendliness.
155
 Accordingly, 
female leadership is often met with far more resistance from men as well as other women, 
further limiting women who desire to be leaders from moving up the ranks as easily.
156
 
Unlike their male counterparts, female leaders often must overcome hostility and 
rejection from others in order to exert their influence and authority as well. 
157
 Eagley 
cites two studies, one in which people were told about a woman succeeding in the male-
dominated occupation of electrical engineering.
158
 The study showed that those people 
“assumed that the woman was less likable, less attractive, less happy, and less socially 
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desirable than a woman who succeeds in a typically feminine career.”159 In another study, 
when told about a group of “successful female managers,” study participants labeled 
them as more “deceitful, pushy, selfish, and abrasive than ‘successful male 
managers.’”160  
On the other side of the double bind, when women are “too nice” or 
accommodating, people are more likely to raise questions as to their ability to lead thus 
requiring women to “outperform men to be seen as equally competent.”161 The earlier 
mentioned case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins presents a solid example of how one 
woman could be denied competence despite the fact that she had accomplished more than 
her male counterparts (in the form of securing a $25 million contract with the 
government, something none of the partnership candidates had done).
162
  Similarly, Carly 
Fiorina, former CEO of Hewlett-Packard recalls her experience with the double bind 
thusly: “In the chat rooms around Silicon Valley, from the time I arrived and until long 
after I left HP, I was routinely referred to as a ‘bimbo,’ or a ‘bitch’—too soft or too hard, 
and presumptuous, besides.”163  
The psychology surrounding leadership is undeniably complicated, but 
nonetheless is obviously influenced by the fact that men have historically been the only 
ones who could be leaders. While this is no longer the case today, the impact of male 
dominance still pervades many fields of employment and the way the general population 
understands successful leadership as well. The prejudice surrounding female leadership 
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therefore must be addressed by the law to the extent that the passage of time has not been 
able to correct these notions and to the extent that they are imbedded so deeply into our 
understandings of gender and behavioral propriety as well. Furthermore, unless the law 
intercedes, the costs of this generalized understanding of leadership as a masculine 
domain will continue to go unaddressed in discrimination claims raised by women who 
have failed to receive promotions or secure job offers in male-dominant fields. 
C. The Costs of Masculine Understandings of Leadership in Case Law 
Case law surrounding discrimination in the context of promotions highlights the 
disparity experienced by women in their male-dominant fields. In these cases, 
discrimination takes a far more insidious form rather than an outright dismissal of a 
woman for simply being female. Discrimination shows itself instead through more subtle 
forms, such as an attitudinal penalty, or lower scores in evaluations, or simply through 
the excuse that a woman is just “not the right fit” for the job or for the company—an 
approach many employers take successfully.
164
 
 In Wilson v. B/E Aerospace a female employee brought a claim for 
discrimination after she was not promoted despite her supervisor’s admittance that she 
was “the obvious candidate” and “most qualified” for the job.165 Her supervisor explained 
to her however that, “women aren’t typically in that type of position.”166 The Court there 
ultimately ruled that Wilson had not made a prima facie case of discrimination.
167
 More 
substantially, in Jones v. Rivers, the plaintiff Jones was denied a promotion in favor of a 
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male subordinate.
168
 Both the male subordinate and the promoting officer, David Rivers, 
stated that Ms. Jones was “very helpful” “very patient” “cooperative” “intelligent” 
“compassionate” and “dedicated” but nevertheless did not have “leadership qualities.”169  
The court recounts, “stating his preference for aggressive individuals, Rivers described 
Jonas as ‘timid’” though she excelled in every aspect of her job in terms of 
performance.
170
 Similarly, in Greenbaum v. Handelsbanken, a female plaintiff working in 
finance was consecutively denied a promotion to a vice-president position despite her 
consistently exceptional performance on the job and glowing evaluations and 
recommendations from her direct Supervisor at SNY, an international banking 
corporation.
171
 Promotions were decided by a general management committee consisting 
of a few men acting as department heads, men who genuinely could not give a reason for 
their failure to promote, except that it wasn’t discrimination. 172  For this reason, 
Greenbaum was able to succeed on her discrimination claim in this case, as did Jones, in 
her discrimination claim. However, it is significant to note that not all women can 
maintain the level of exceptionality that both Jones and Greenbaum had presented, which 
were ultimately the most essential elements in proving the prejudicial attitude the 
employers had been able to keep under wraps prior to these women’s claims.173  
 Thus, these cases support the conclusion that in the context of leadership, 
polarized thinking continues to dominate and act as an obstacle to women’s success in 
leadership roles and their ascent to positions of greater influence. The cases also suggest 
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that people only respond to explicit evidence of a woman’s substantial superiority over a 
man before deciding that the woman truly is qualified or better than a man at certain 
tasks. Interestingly, women who meet the high expectations placed on her as a leader are 
often assumed by others to have an even higher degree of individual competence than 
men who hold similar positions. As Eagly notes: 
People think that only extreme individual competence could allow women to 
surmount the challenges that they have overcome: – but only for their category, 
and then gender and racial stereotypes are likely to prevail. To the extent that 
people have an implicitly higher standard for women for success in masculine 
domains, female candidates have to work doubly hard to get recognized. Women 
generally have to have extraordinary track records in order to have career 
success.
174
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
In today’s society, very rarely do people intend to discriminate based on gender or 
biological sex. Far more common today is discrimination that results from a perceived 
mismatch between a person’s gender and the role they are expected to play. To the extent 
that discrimination law fails to realize the insidious nature of discrimination, it will fail to 
rectify the discrimination where it is most dangerous—the leadership level. Granted that 
gender categorization is an unavoidable part of the way humans process information 
about one another, the law should intercede to the extent that gender and sex are defined 
solely based on biology or “drastic stereotyping” and therefore do not take into account 
the extensive identity work required of women. By incorporating the social 
manifestations of biological sex and acknowledging the fact that gender performance 
does not have to meet a rigid female=femininity and male=masculinity dichotomy, the 
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law will not be able to penalize claimants of discrimination for their failure to conform to 
historical notions of what it means to be a man or a woman. 
More than ever, gender diversity within the top-management levels of the 
business world is crucial. For one, women, more than men, have exhibited a style of 
leadership that is more in line with the way the most successful contemporary businesses 
are run.
175
 Studies have shown that democratic, participative, and collaborative styles of 
leadership have been more successful and welcomed today than the old models of 
hierarchy.
176 Furthermore, today’s companies must learn how to best adapt to innovation 
as technology advances at an ever-increasing speed. This requires that leaders increase 
the availability of knowledge by creating collaborative workflows and multidisciplinary 
teams. Leaders must also acknowledge the intensification of competition for talent that is 
globally present by adapting motivational behaviors such as “inspiration” and 
“expectations and rewards”.177 Of these behaviors that are particularly important today, 
three of the four (inspiration, participative decision making, and expectations and 
rewards), are observed more often in women than in men.
178
 A change in the law then, 
may be the best and fastest way to bring about the change in leadership that we 
desperately need as a society.  
One way to change the law would be a legislative requirement that courts apply a 
uniform definition of sex discrimination that is broad enough to acknowledge variations 
in gender performance and excludes impermissible stereotyping of what characteristics 
specifically belong to the male or female label. Another way to change the law would be 
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a change in the evidentiary standard that would allow considerations of any serious 
identity work that an employee had to engage in in order to navigate the work 
environment and become accepted by his/her co-employees. In this way, claimants of 
discrimination who had fought hard to blend in to the existing culture of her workplace 
before bringing a discrimination claim would not lose their claim for having done so, 
since courts would not be able to conclude that she “welcomed” any harassing behavior 
or participated in the culture to her own detriment. Such changes in the law would allow 
for a more unbiased approach to whether discrimination has occurred and take away from 
the courts any opportunity to insert their own judgments on what is or is not proper 
behavior befitting of a man or a woman. In light of the arguments for greater female 
presence at the leadership level, such an intervention by the law could potentially result 
in an improved American economy and better working conditions for every American. 
And furthermore, while the world will continue to see women use their advanced 
educations to get ahead in formal leadership positions, their absence in the elite and 
highest level of leadership remain a threat to our society and reinforces the notion of 
gender hierarchy. Some people may object to changes in discrimination law, whether 
through a broadened definition of sex discrimination or by allowing identity work to be 
relevant evidence, primarily for two reasons. The first would be the fear that such 
changes would result in a flood of litigation from not only women, but the transgender 
community as well. Similarly, there would be a concern for trial efficiency, since the 
expansion of permissible evidence would probably result in longer trials. However, 
relying on society to correct itself seems unrealistic in light of the stability of the 
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unchanging demographics in positions of greatest power and influence.
179
  And in the 
same vein, as much as transgender rights remain an issue that people are willing to fight 
for, courts should not be afraid of taking on these claims and solidifying the importance 
of equal rights for all, despite gender performance.  
Good leaders are not special because they can simply bring in a profit or because 
they have great ideas. Good leaders are good leaders because they motivate us, encourage 
us, and set an example for what should be done.
180
 Old models of leadership focused on 
managing and commanding have become obsolete,
181
 and those that still subscribe to 
these notions are arguably failing to develop alongside the rest of our fast paced 
society.
182
  Leadership now is less about managing people and more about effectively 
guiding people—people don’t want to be managed and the best workers don’t need 
someone to oversee their daily activities.
183
 Leaders therefore must act as visionaries who 
can maintain their vision and purpose as a beacon to others who subscribe to that vision 
and purpose. For too long we have accepted the status quo of the idealization of 
masculine portrayals of leadership and the male-oriented models in the workplace, and 
the law in many cases have supported their continued existence. By addressing these 
problems directly through a change in the law, our society might finally see the kind of 
advances, both culturally and technologically, of which equal rights activists have only 
dared to dream.   
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